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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OE' UTAH
KEN HOLM and GLEN STEED
d/b/a H & S ENTERPRISES,
a partnership,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
Case No. 18067

vs.
B

&

M SERVICE, INC. ,
Defendant and
Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant to

recover damages for the negligent destruction to plaintiffs'
personal property.

(R.2,3)
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was granted on the
ground that the Statute of Limitations had run on plaintiffs'
claim.

(R.6,9)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the order dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint and that the matter be remanded to Third
District Court for further proceedings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 30, 1978 plaintiffs were moving $40,000 worth
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of steel pipe with their tractor and trailer 18 miles east of
Rangeley, Colorado.

Plaintiffs' tractor and trailer overturned

causing minor damage to the pipe.

(R.2,3)

The Colorado Highway Patrol investigated the accident
and at its request, defendant's tractor attempted to tow plaintiffs' trailer carrying the steel pipe to the nearest town. (R.2,3)
Due to the recklessness and negligence of defendant's
agents in securing the pipe to the trailer, coupling its tractor
to the trailer and other particulars of negligence, the tractor
of defendant and the trailer of plaintiffs overturned a second
time causing extensive damage and destruction to plaintiffs'
steel pipe.

(R.2,3)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

ALL NEGLIGENT TORTS, INCLUDING PROPERTY DAMAGE, SHOULD
BE GOVERNED BY THE PROVISION OF THE FOUR YEAR STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS, 78-12-25(2), UCA (1953).
The sole issue involved in this appeal is whether
negligently caused property damage should be governed by the three
year statute of limitations, 78-12-26(2), UCA (1953) or the four
year statute of limitations, supra.
The four year statute of limitations, 78-12-25(2), UCA
(1953) provides as follows:
Within four years:
( 1)
( 2)

An action for relief not otherwise provided
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for by law.
The three year statute of limitations, 78-12-26(2), UCA
(1953) provides as follows:
Within three years (1)
An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury
to real property; provided, that when waste or trespass
is committed by means of underground works upon any
mining claim, the cause of action shall not be deemed
to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved
party of the facts constituting such waste or trespass.
(2)
An action for taking, detaining or injuring
personal property, including actions for specific
recovery thereof; provided, that in all cases where
the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually
included in the term "livestock", if such animal had
strayed or was stolen from the true owner without his
fault, the cause shall not be deemed to have accrued
until the owner has actual knowledge of such facts as
would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the
possession thereof by the defendant.
(3)
An action for relief on the ground of fraud
or mistake; but the cause of action in such case shall
not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by
the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud
or mistake.
(4)
An action for a liability created by the
statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or
forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed
by the statutes of this state.
In construing 78-12-26(2), supra, the 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals in Utah Poultry and Farmers Cooperative v. Utah
Ice and Storage Company, 187 F.2d 652

(10th Cir. 1951), had the

following to say:
No decision has been cited, and we have found none,
wherein the courts of Utah or California have specifically
held the three year statute "all inclusive", of actions
for injuries to personal property. We think, however,
that the language of the adjudicated cases indicates a
disposition to apply the statute to all actions for
"taking, detaining or injuring personal property"."
(emphasis added) .
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There are still no Utah cases holding the three year
statute to be all inclusive for injuries to personal property.
In the case of Reese v. Qualtrough, 48 Utah 23, 156 P.
955

(1916) defendants ''had willfully and intentionally flowed

large quantities of waste water through certain ditches . . . and
had willfully and intentionally changed the course of said ditches
. willfully and intentionally diverted the waters from the
stream . . . killing plaintiff's fish living therein . . . willfully and intentionally place certain boards into the bed of the
stream .
destroyed

.

. whereby large numbers of said fish were killed and

. . . .
II

This was clearly and unequivocally an intentional tort
and the court correctly decided that the three year statute was
applicable.
The language in Reese v. Qualtrough, supra, that, "It
is the wrongful acts which result in injury and damage which give
the right of action, and, if the injuries are to personal property,
the statute fixes the time within which such an action must be
brought, and the name of the action can have no effect upon the
question of what statute controls.", should be construed as being
limited to intentional injuries.
Subdivisions (1),

(2)

and (3) of 78-12-26, UCA (1953)

describe intentional torts, acts or misconduct.

The application

of the four year statute rather than subdivision (1) of the three
year statute was ruled upon in the case of O'Neill v. San Pedro,
L.A.

& S.L. R. Co., 38 Utah 475, 114 P.127 (1911).

Plaintiff's

house was located near defendant's railroad tracks and was damaged
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by the jar of the trains and the emission of smoke and cinders.
The court held that subdivision (1) of the three year statute,
trespass to lands, was not applicable because there was no common
law trespass which required direct entry on lands.

Instead, the

court held that the acts of defendant railroad were action on the
case and the four year statute was applicable.
The following language was cited approvingly by the
Supreme Court of Washington in Welch v. Seattle & M.R. Co, 56
Wash. 97, 105 P.166

(1909), the case having been cited in Reese

v. Qualtrough, supra:
Mr. Blackstone, on star page 123 of Book 3 (Lewis'
Ed.), makes a distinction as follows: "And it is a
settled distinction that, where an act is done which
is in itself an immediate injury to another's person
or property, there the remedy is usually by an action
of trespass vi et armis; but where there is no act done,
but only a culpable omission, or where the act is not
immediately injurious, but only by consequence and
collaterally, there no action of trespass vi et armis
will lie, but an action on the special case, as the
damages consequent on such omission or act."
Thus, analysis of the factual situation in terms of
whether it sounds in trespass or in action on the case has been
the subject of judicial inquiry for hundreds of years and has
been exercised by the Utah Supreme Court in the O'Neill case, supra.
Analysis and application to the instant case demonstrates
the damage in plaintiff's personal property was unintentional
and therefore, action on the case, and plaintiff's claim should
have been held to be subject to the four year statute of limitations.
Personal injuries resulting from negligent misconduct
are governed by the four year statute of limitations.
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 1 Utah 235

(

).

See Thomas

One of the most
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frequently asserted causes of action excluding divorce and debt
suits is for personal injury arising out of an automobile accident.
In a great many of these cases a claim for automobile damage arise
out of the accident.
This court has held that splitting causes of action is
improper and a plaintiff's claims for personal injury and property
damage must be asserted in one action.

Raymer v. Hi-Line Transport,

Inc., 15 Utah 2d 427, 394 P.2d 333 (1964).

If the three year

statute is applicable to negligently caused property damage as
contended by respondent then the plaintiff who waits for three
and one-half years for his severe and perhaps permanent injury to
stabilize before filing suit has lost his claim for his property
damage.

See Dearden v. Hey,

Mass.

, 24 NE.2d 644 (1939).

Respondent further claims that there would be two
different limitation periods for damage to personal property and
this would subvert the purpose of the three statute "because it
is nearly always possible to allege an intentional tort in terms
of negligence."

Alleging a negligent tort rather than an

intentional tort still leaves plaintiff with the burden of proving
negligence in order to justify the longer period of limitation.
In the recent case of Matheson v. Pearson, Utah, 619
P.2d 321 (1980) this court found two different periods of limitation were applicable to an injury situation requiring a factual
determination as to whether a tort was intentional or negligent
and whether the one year statute of limitations or the four year
statute of limitations was applicable.
It is submitted, contrary to respondent's contentions,
that 78-12-26(2) UCA (1953)

is not clear and unambiguous.

"Taking"
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and "detaining" "personal property" means forceful and intentional
if any language ever could.

Also it is submitted that the "or"

linking "taking, detaining" "with injuring personal property" is
conjunctive so that the "injuring" must be part of the "taking"
and "detaining".
This interpretation is reinforced by including the action
for specific recovery of personal property in the statute itself.
The very presence of this remedy suggests intentional wrong doing.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that this court should rule that negligently caused injuries to personal property are governed by the
provisions of 78-12-25(2)

rather than 78-12-26(2).

statute can and should be interpreted that way.

The three year

Bench and bar

alike will be able to detect an intentional tort under 78-12-26(2)
and a negligent tort under 78-12-25(2).
Dated this

day of March, 1982.

Respectfully submitted,

Wendell P. Ables
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants
Suite 14, Intrade Building
1399 South Seventh East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of March, 1982

I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief, to Dale
J. Lambert of Christensen, Jensen and Powell, Attorneys for
Defendant, 900 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.
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